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AN ESSAY IN THE ECONOMICS OF POST-LOSS MINIMIZATION: 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INSURANCE 





This article proposes a simple model and an analysis of the incentive problem in terms 
of post-loss minimization in the insurance market. This essay discusses a model of the 
insurance market in which the insurer decides which of the two types of clause which are 
inconsistent with the commercial law, or no clause, best influences the insured's choice as 
to whether or not to make an effort to reduce the loss. The essay seeks to investigate the 
exogenous situations where the insurer presents these types of clause, or no clause, in 




All entities, such as firms and individuals, face the potential for loss. Firms can be 
plagued by numerous types of accident that decrease profit. Individuals who drive a car 
may fear injuring themselves, other drivers, or pedestrians. They should have some 
incentive to prevent loss. (See for example, Dorfman, 2002) 
Insurance is one of the risk management systems available to transfer exposure to risk 
from the firm or individual to the insurer. Arrow (1970) argues that insurance permits a 
reduction in the social amount of risk-bearing in order to divorce risk-bearing from 
productive activity. 
However, the shifting of risk towards the insurer might also encourage carelessness. 
Arrow (1963) named this problem “moral hazard”. Many articles and books have 
discussed moral hazard over several decades. For example, Zeckhauser (1970) indicates 
the trade-off between risk-bearing and incentives that reduce the losses. Many previous 
articles have analyzed risk-sharing rules to induce loss minimization. For example, 
Holmstrom (1979) and Shavell (1979) have formalized the value of deductibles when 
moral hazard is present. Pauly (1974), Arnott and Stiglitz (1986) and Lee (1992) have 
proved the role of government intervention in coping with moral hazard. Holmstrom 
(1982) has considered the case of a team, in which there is a joint production function for 
the members. Radner (1981) and Rubinstein and Yaari (1983) have shown that 
multi-period insurance contracts may prevent the generation of moral hazard. Holmstrom 
and Milgrom (1991) have illustrated this problem through multitask agents. Milgrom and 
Roberts (1992) and Winter (1992) have provided a good survey of this field. 
Some insurance literature has distinguished between two types of loss minimization. 
Bennett (1992), for example, defined pre-loss minimization as “the steps taken by 
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insurers before a loss-producing event to reduce the likelihood of that event and/or its 
severity if it does occur”, and post-loss minimization as “the steps taken after a loss to 
ensure that the loss is contained to the minimum amount”. Dorfman (2002) called the 
former “loss prevention” and the latter “loss reduction”. 
Moral hazard is one of the serious problems in the insurance market. Early studies 
concentrated on considering incentive to lower the probability of loss before an accident 
takes place. That is, the studies were in terms of pre-loss minimization. They have shown 
that unobservability by the insurer of the insured directly attracts moral hazard. Even if 
the effort can be observed by the insurer, the incentive for the insured to lower the 
probability of large loss remains after an accident takes place. This essay proposes a 
simple model and an analysis of this incentive problem. That is, this essay will investigate 
moral hazard in terms of post-loss minimization. In the economic models developed in 
previous research, little attention has been paid to post-loss minimization because the two 
types of loss minimization look the same. Both have the effect of reducing the expected 
loss; the only difference is the timing of the loss minimization. However, the incentive 
systems for each type of loss minimization are not similar and their effects are not 
necessarily the same in the real world. Therefore, it is useful to analyze them 
independently. 
There is an interesting incentive method designed to assist post-loss minimization in 
Japanese (and several foreign countries’) insurance law. It can be called “duty to sue and 
labor”. In Japanese insurance law, the insured must be wished to reduce the loss when an 
accident takes place, and whenever an accident takes place, the insurer must incur all of 
the costs that are paid by the insured in order to reduce the losses. 
However, there are clauses of the insurance contract that are inconsistent with this law. 
In the real world, two types of clause mainly prevail. One gives that the insurer has the 
right not to compensate effort-costs paid by the insured. The other provides compensation 
for an insured’s effort-cost within the range of the insurance amount. Hereafter, I call the 
former “F-clause” and the latter “P-clause”. Because both clauses are valid in Japan, the 
insurer who presents either type of clause may not necessarily incur the effort-cost paid 
by the insured. 
The purpose of this essay is to analyze the effectiveness of these clauses. This essay 
seeks to investigate the exogenous situations where the insurer utilizes the above clauses, 




There are many insured and one insurer in the economy. Except for their disutility for 
effort, the insured are assumed to be identical. Each insured purchases one unit of an 
insurance contract from this monopolistic insurer. The insured's utility is assumed to be 
linear for wealth AW . It consists of insurance money the insured might get and disutility 
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for effort. Thus, this essay will take the insured’s utility function to be 
 
( ) ( )eWu A φ−                                                                                                              (1) 
 
where ( )•u  is continuous, strictly increasing and (weakly) concave, and ( ) ee iλφ =  for 
effort and ( ) 0=eφ  for no effort. It is assumed that e  is given exogenously and iλ  is a 
subjective variable for the insured and is distributed according to a cumulative 
distribution function ( )•F . The insurer cannot know each insured’s iλ  but can know the 
form of the distribution ( )•F . 
Furthermore, it is assumed that the insurer is risk-neutral. The insurer's utility is its own 
wealth PW  minus compensations to the insured if this is incurred. Thus, the insurer’s 
utility function is given by 
 
( )eW P ϕ−                              (2) 
 
where ( ]e,0∈ϕ  for incurring and 0=ϕ  for not incurring. 
The insured and insurer want to maximize their respective utility and this paper sets out 
a four stage game as follows. 
In the first stage, the insurer decides which of the two clauses, or none, will be presented. 
In the second stage, a nature choice is made as to whether or not an accident will take 
place, according to probability ( )1,0∈π , which is given exogenously. If an accident does 
not take place then the game ends. If the choice is that an accident takes place, then the 
game is continued. 
In the third stage, the insured decides whether or not to make an effort to reduce the loss. 
This model assumes, for simplicity, that in this stage an insured who does not make an 
effort is faced with two states of the world, 
2
1  loss and total loss, with probabilities 1π  
and 2π , respectively. In addition, it is assumed that ( )πππ ,0, 21 ∈ , 21 πππ +=  and 
21 ππ > . In contrast, if an insured makes an effort, both probabilities can be reversed. 
That is, to make an effort can lower the probability of large loss. 
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In the fourth stage, a nature choice is made as to which two states take place according to 
probabilities that are decided in the previous stage. 
Each insured’s utility consists of its own initial wealth w , coverage rate ( ]1,0∈α , 
insurable asset D , and premium of the full insurance p . This essay assumes for 
simplicity that these are exogenous variables. Furthermore, they can be rewritten in forms 
that will be convenient for the next section as follows: 
 







⎛ −−−≡ DpwuB αα 1
2
1 ,                           (4) 
 
( )( )DpwuC αα −−−≡ 1 ,               (5) 
 
CB −≡Δ .                             (6) 
 
Since ( ]1,0∈α  and ( )•u  is strictly increasing, the sign of Δ  cannot be negative. 
Finally, to classify the difference between two clauses, it takes the further specification 
2
0 De α<< . This inequality means that when the insured's efforts and the nature choice 
leads to 
2
1  loss, the full amount of the effort-cost is incurred by the insurer only if the 
insurer presents the P-clause. In the model, the difference between the two clauses only 
occurs with the above situation. 
The insurance market can be represented by the game situation. Figure 1 depicts the 
above situation in the form of the game tree. 
 
Analysis of the Equilibrium 
 
In this section, I seek a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. This equilibrium can be 
derived by backward induction. At the beginning of the equilibrium analysis, for a given 
insurer’s decision, the insured decides whether or not to make the effort to reduce the loss. 
If insured i  at each information set makes an effort, the insured obtains expected utility, 




S πλππ −+= 211 ,              (7) 
 
eCBEU i
S λπππ 2212 −+= ,                                        (8) 
 
CBEU S 213 ππ += .                            (9) 
 
In contrast, if the insured does not make an effort, the insured obtains expected utility, 
NEU . 
 
CBEU N 12 ππ += .                          (10) 
 
Therefore, the insured at each information set is better off by making an effort if and 
only if 
 







211 0 ,                     (11) 
 









2212 0 ,                     (12) 
 
( ) iNS anyforEUEU λππ 0213 ≥Δ−=− .           (13) 
 
The Equation (11) means that a small number of insured whose iλ  is lower than 
∗λ  
only make an effort when the insurer presents the F-clause. The interpretation of Equation 
(12) is that some insured whose iλ  is lower than 
∗∗λ  only make an effort when the 
insurer presents the P-clause. The Equation (13) states that all insured are sure to make an 
effort when none of the clauses are used. 
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N N N N N N
Insured1 Insured2 Insured3
Note:
  1. A node with label "N" is a nature node.
  2. The above value in each pair is the insured's
      utility and the below value is the insurer's utility.








To consider the insurer’s strategy in the second stage of the game, the insurers’ utilities 
are defined in terms of insured decisions. If the insurer presents the F-clause, the P-clause, 
or no clause, it obtains the expected utility, FEU 0 , 
PEU 0 , 
SEU 0 , respectively. 
 










⎛ +−= ∗∗ DDFDDFpEU F απαπλαπαπλα 12210 2
11
2
1 ,        (14) 
 










⎛ ++−= ∗∗∗∗ DDFeDDFpEU p απαπλπαπαπλα 121210 2
11
2
1 ,        (15) 
 
eDDpEU S παπαπα −−−= 210 2
1 .            (16) 
 
Using Equations (14) to (16), the following equations can be derived. 
 
( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) eFFFDEUEU PF 12100 2
1 πλππλλα ∗∗∗∗∗ +−−−=− ,         (17) 
 
( )( )( ) eFDEUEU SF πππλα +−−−=− ∗ 2100 12
1 ,           (18) 
 






⎛ −−−−=− ∗∗ .                                    (19) 
 
















F ,             (20) 
 







eF .             (21) 
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F  is less than unity. 
The insurer presents the P-clause if Equation (17) is not positive and Equation (19) is not 
negative, or equivalently, 
 
( )












F ,             (22) 
 










−≥∗∗ .                        (23) 
 
The insurer presents no clause if both Equations (18) and (19) are not positive, or 
equivalently, 
 







eF ,             (24) 
 










−≤∗∗ .                        (25) 
 
 
A Special Case 
 
In this section, a special case is constructed to focus on interactions between equilibrium 
strategies and the exogenous variables. 
Consider the special case in which all of the insured are risk-neutral and whose iλ  are 
distributed in uniform shares along [ ]1,0 . This special case can be used because it is 
straightforward to calculate ( )Dα−=Δ 1
2
1 , ( )∗λF , and ( )∗∗λF  which are given by 
 







121 −−=∗ ,                         (26) 
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=∗∗ .             (27) 
 
Furthermore, the Inequalities (20), (21), and (23) can be rewritten as the equalities that 
represent a typical boundary between two strategies. Substituting Equations (26) and (27) 

















































−− .           (30) 
 









=≡ .             (31) 
 
Hence, Equation (31) is a linear and strictly increasing function of α . 
Equation (29) can be written as 
 






eeFS .            (33) 
 
Calculation shows that solutions are real when 
5
4
≥α . Equation (33) can be depicted as 








Equation (30) is equivalent to 
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( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) 01124 2212212122 =−−++−−− ππαααππαππππ DeDe .        (34) 
 
Like Equation (32), Equation (34) is also a quadratic equation with respect to e . Thus, 
the solutions for this equation can be written as 
 







































= .            (36) 
 
Let +α  and −α  denote the larger and smaller root of Equation (36), respectively. Unlike 
Equation (33), Equation (35) can be depicted as the two hyperbolas because 
10 <<< +− αα . In other words, two curves are shown on the coordinate plane that may 




Proofs of these are presented in the Appendix. 

















These two inequalities will be helpful later in depicting the figure that illustrates some 
results. 
 


























FPPSFS eDDee ,         (37) 
 























FPPS eDDe                        (38) 
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where superscript ＋ and － denote the larger and smaller root of Equations (33) and (35). 
Finally, recall that this model assumed that α
2
0 De <<  and 
2





21 D− . 
The result is shown in Figure 2. The result indicates that in the special case in which all 
of the insured are risk neutral and whose iλ  are distributed in uniform shares along [ ]1,0 , 
the combination of the coverage rate ( α≡ ) and the level of effort-cost ( e≡ ) has led to the 
equilibrium outcome. 
Figure 2 shows the equilibrium outcome where the insurer presents no clause and all of 
the insured's effort is horizontally shaded. The vertically shaded area is such that in 
equilibrium, the insurer presents the P-clause and only those insured whose iλ  is lower 
than ∗∗λ  make an effort. The equilibrium where the insurer presents the F-clause and only 
a small number of insured whose iλ  is lower than 
∗λ  make an effort lies in the 
diagonally shaded region of Figure 2. 
 
Conclusion and Remarks 
 
This paper has used a model of the insurance market, in which the insurer decides which 
of two clauses or no clause is used, and the insured chooses whether or not to make an 
effort to reduce the loss after an accident takes place. 
The result is given in Figure 2. Roughly speaking, when the coverage rate is low and the 
level of effort-cost is high, in equilibrium the F-clause is appropriate for the insurer. 
When the coverage rate is moderate and the level of effort-cost is moderate or high, the 
P-clause is appropriate. When the coverage rate is high and the level of effort-cost is low, 
in equilibrium the use of no clause is appropriate. 
This conclusion is based on the following explanations. Firstly, consider the case of the 
low coverage rate. The insured want to make an effort because the insured must pay much 
of the loss. In contrast, the insurer has little incentive to reduce the loss because the 
insurance money is relatively low. Thus, in this case the insurer has a tendency to present 
either clause and only some insured make an effort. Secondly, consider the case of low 
effort-cost. Both the insured and the insurer have considerable interest in post-loss 
minimization. However, the insurer may present the P-clause because the effect of that 
choice is dependent on the response of the insured's strategy to the insurer's strategy. Thus, 













Figure 2:  The Region of Each Equilibrium
Note:
region is such that the insurer represents nothing
and all of the insured effort.
region is such that the insurer represents P-
clause and some insured only effort.
region is such that the insurer represents F-





The results shed some light on several questions. For example, the insurance system is 
designed to promote not only post-loss minimization but also pre-loss minimization. It is 
well known that deductibles and coinsurance, which lower the coverage rate, might be an 
inducement for pre-loss minimization. However, these devices also effect post-loss 
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minimization. The result of this research indicates that the insurer can present either 
clause if the coverage rate is not high. Thus, the number of insured who make an effort 
with post-loss minimization will be decreased by these devices. A striking consideration 
is that deductibles and coinsurance are undesirable for post-loss minimization although 
these devices induce to active pre-loss minimization. In other words, this model 
illustrates the tradeoff between pre- and post-loss minimization. Moreover, these devices 
may not be effective in the equilibrium region where the insurer adopts no clause and all 
insured make an effort. Let α  be a maximum coverage rate defined by these devices. It is 
readily verified that if at least 
5
4
≤α , the insurer is sure to use either clause. Thus, this 
explanation can provide the reason why there are a few insurance contracts that do not 
include either clause in the (Japanese) insurance market. 
Another example is that, since 1984, Japanese fire insurance contracts “for an 
individual” express that an insurer incurs all of the effort-cost. However, the same 
contract “for a firm” includes the P-clause. The reason why the difference exists can be 
explained in terms of two exogenous variables. First, in general the individual's coverage 
rate is higher than the firm’s because many firms utilize many kinds of special clauses 
(for instance, blanket policy) to lower the coverage rate. Second, the level of the 
effort-cost for a firm is generally larger than that for an individual. In the most plausible 
case, when a fire occurs in a large-scale firm, several helicopters are used in order to 
sprinkle a flood of extinguishing agent. Thus, there is a difference, not only in the 
coverage rate but also in the level of the effort-cost between an individual and a firm. 
According to the model developed in this essay, it is rational that an insurer voluntarily 
presents no clause “for an individual” and the P-clause “for a firm”. 
Clearly, this model involves a number of simplifying assumptions. A major limitation of 
this paper is to restrict attention to the special case. This is realistic for the case where the 
insured are risk-averse and their disutility factors are distributed non-uniformly. Much 












1 >++⇔>++ πππππππππππ .         (A1) 
 











π .            (A2) 
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∂g .                        (A3) 
 




π , g  
is always strictly negative, and Equation (A2) is impossible, hence, 1<+α . 
Next, prove that 
5
4
>+α . If 
5
4
≤+α , then from Equation (36) the following equation 
























π .           (A4) 
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π for , then h  is a 
 16
















Arnott, Richard and E Joseph Stiglitz, February 1986, Moral Hazard and Optimal 
Commodity Taxation, Journal of Public Economics, pp.1-24. 
Arrow, Kenneth J, December 1963, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical 
Care, American Economic Review, pp. 941-969. 
Arrow, Kenneth J, 1970, Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing, North-Holland. 
Bennett, Cheltenham, 1992, Dictionary of Insurance, Pitman Publishing. 
Dorfman, Mark S, 2002, Introduction to Risk Management and Insurance, 7th Ed., 
Prentice-Hall. 
Holmstrom, Bengt, Spring 1979, Moral Hazard and Observability, Bell Journal of 
Economics, pp. 74-91. 
Holmstrom, Bengt, Autumn 1982, Moral Hazard in Teams, Bell Journal of Economics, 
pp. 324-340. 
Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom, Special issue 1991, Multitask Principal-Agent 
Analysis: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design, Journal of Law, 
Economics, and Organization, pp. 24-52. 
Lee, Kangoh, June 1992, Moral Hazard, Insurance and Public Loss Prevention, Journal of 
Risk and Insurance, pp. 275-282. 
Milgrom, Paul and John Roberts, 1992, Economics, Organization and Management, 
Prentice-Hall. 
Pauly, Mark V, February 1974,  Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The 
Role of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection, Quarterly Journal of Economics, pp. 
44-54. 
Radner, Roy, September 1981, Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated 
Principal-Agent Relationship, Econometrica, pp. 1127-1148. 
Rubinstein, Ariel and E Menahem Yaari, June 1983, Repeated Insurance Contracts and 
Moral Hazard, Journal of Economic Theory, pp. 74-97. 
Shavell, Steven, November 1979, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, pp. 55-73. 
Winter, Ralph A, 1992, Moral Hazard and Insurance Contracts, in: Dionne, Georges (Ed.), 
Contributions to Insurance Economics, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Zeckhauser, Richard, March 1970, Medical Insurance: A Case Study of the Tradeoff 
 17
between Risk Spreading and Appropriate Incentives, Journal of Economic Theory, pp. 
10-26. 
